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Abstract 
The present paper studied third-degree price discrimination in wholesale markets and its welfare property when a 
monopolistic manufacturer sells his/her products to two retailers who have different qualities and costs of sales. Our 
results revealed that price discrimination within a certain extent increases social welfare under some conditions, which 
would support the soft enforcement of prohibiting price discrimination by a monopolistic wholesaler.
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     well-known conclusion is not achieved.3
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some preliminaries in order to
analyze the eect of manufacturer’s price-discrimination on social welfare. Section 3 presents
the results of this analysis. Section 4 presents the concluding remarks.
2. Preliminaries
We conduct a welfare analysis based on Aiura (2007).4 This section introduces a price
decision model according to Aiura (2007) and presents some preliminaries to enable us to
conduct a welfare analysis. We consider that a monopolistic manufacturer sells his/her products
to two price-competing retailers who have dierent qualities and costs of sales: One is a high-
quality, high-cost (retailer H), and the other is a low-quality, low-cost (retailer L). The two
retailers resell the manufacturer’s products to end consumers.5 The manufacturer acts as a
Stackelberg price leader. In the ﬁrst stage, the manufacturer sets dierent wholesale prices for
retailers H and L under linear pricing contracts.6 In the second stage, retailers H and L choose
their respective retail prices based on the wholesale prices. wi denotes the wholesale price, pi
denotes the retail price for retailer i (i = H,L), and qi denotes the quantity of sales by retailer
i (i = H,L). The manufacturer incurs constant marginal product cost, denoted by cM, and
retailers H and L incur constant marginal selling costs, denoted as cH and cL, respectively. We
assume that retailer H incurs higher marginal costs than retailer L, cH > cL and that consumers
are heterogeneous with regard to the valuation of the manufacturer’s product. We denote the
customer’s reservation price for the product by v and, for analytic simplicity, assume that it is
uniformly distributed within the consumer population from 0 to 1, with a density of 1. Because
retail quality is dierent for dierent retailers, we assume that the true valuation of a product
through retail sales equals the valuation of the product multiplied by retail quality, and we
denote the customer’s reservation price for the product through retailer i by θiv (θi > 0, i =
H,L). To simplify the notation, we normalize θH as 1 and denote θL by θ. Because retailer H
oers higher retail quality than retailer L, we assume that 0 < θL < θH (i.e., 0 < θ < 1). Retailer
i oers the product at price pi, so that a consumer whose reservation price is v derives a net
consumer surplus of θiv − pi by buying the product. Thus, if θiv − pi > θjv − pj (for i , j,
i = H,L and j = H,L) and θiv − pi > 0 (for i = H,L), the consumer buys the product through
retailer i.7 Therefore, the demand functions for each retailer, qH and qL, depend on pH and pL.
When qH = 0 or qL = 0, either retailer does not make a sale, and price discrimination must
be unobserved. Because our purpose is to know welfare change by price discrimination, we
assume qH > 0 and qL > 0, thus







3Other extension models in which this well-known conclusion is not achieved are Yoshida (2000), Adachi
(2005), and Galera and Zaratiegui (2006).
4Aiura (2007) does not analyze the welfare property of price discrimination by a upstream ﬁrm.
5We assume that the manufacturer does not permit retailers to buy and sell the manufacturer’s products from
other retailers. Moreover, we assume that retailers cannot change qualities and costs of sales.
6A monopolistic manufacturer might enforce a two-part tari, but in this situation, it is unclear which criterion
we use when deciding whether the manufacturer price-discriminates: lump-sum fee, per-unit charge, or per-unit
lump-sum fee plus per-unit charge. Therefore, at the onset, we assume that a monopolistic manufacturer enforces
linear pricing.
7If θHv − pH ≤ 0 and θLv − pL ≤ 0, we assume that the consumer would not buy the product and would obtain
a zero surplus.
2Using qH and qL, the proﬁts of each retailer, πH and πL, can be written as
πH = (pH − wH − cH)qH, (2)
πL = (pL − wL − cL)qL, (3)
and the proﬁts of the manufacturer, πH, can be written as
πM = (wH − cM)qH + (wL − cM)qL. (4)
Before we assess the eect of price discrimination on social welfare, we need to derive
retail and wholesale pricing. By backward induction, we ﬁrst derive retail pricing when the
wholesale price is given. The ﬁrst-order conditions of (2) and (3) with respect to the retail price
give the retail price equilibrium as follows:
p
∗
H = 1 −





L = θ −





L, we derive the wholesale price. If the manufacturer can exercise price
discrimination, the ﬁrst-order conditions of (4) with respect to the wholesale prices (wH and
wL) give the the best wholesale prices to maximize the manufacturer’s proﬁt as follows:
w
∗
H = cM + δH/2, w
∗
L = cM + δL/2, (7)
where δi denotes θi−ci−cM (for i = H,L). Moreover, δH and δL must satisfy that [θ/(2−θ)]δH <
δL < (2 − θ)δH, in order to satisfy that qH > 0 and qL > 0. The previous derivations are closely
derived by Aiura(2007).
If the manufacturer cannot exercise price discrimination, the manufacturer has to charge a
uniform wholesale price from both retailers; that is, the manufacturer has to satisfy wH = wL.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of (4) with respect to wu = wH = wL give the the best wholesale price
as follows:
w




where δi denotes θi −ci −cM (for i = H,L). Moreover, δH and δL must satisfy that [3θ/(2+2θ−
θ2)]δH < δL < [(8 − θ − θ2)/6]δH, in order to satisfy that qH > 0 and qL > 0. A more detailed
derivation of w∗
u is given in Appendix A. Social welfare is measured by the total surplus, i.e.,





















L) − (1 − qH)(1 − θqL) −
[
(cH + cM)qH + (cL + cM)qL
]
. (9)
Next section shows the change of SW by price discrimination of the manufacturer.
3. Welfare eﬀect by price discrimination
3.1 The parallel between permitting and prohibiting price discrimination
3The simplest method to determine whether price discrimination by the manufacturer is desir-
able on social welfare grounds is to calculate SW|wH=w∗
H,wL=w∗
L −SW|wH=wL=wu∗. Using (1) and (5)
– (9), we derive
SW|wH=w∗
H,wL=w∗
L − SW|wH=wL=wu∗ = −
(δH − δL)[(20 + 9θ − 2θ2)δH − (24 + 7θ − 4θ2)δL]
8(1 − θ)(2 + θ)2(4 − θ)
. (10)
Because 0 < θ < 1 and (20 + 9θ − 2θ2) < (24 + 7θ − 4θ2), (10) implies that SW|wH=w∗
H,wL=w∗
L
is more than SW|wH=wL=wu∗ if δH is a little more than δL; otherwise, SW|wH=w∗
H,wL=w∗
L is less than
SW|wH=wL=wu∗. Moreover, (7) shows that the dierence of w∗
H and w∗
L is directly proportional to
the dierence of δH and δL, and thus, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 1. We assume that the demand of each retailer is positive whether governments
permitorprohibitpricediscrimination. Ifretailer H ischargedatahigherwholesalepricethan
retailer L and the diﬀerence between the two wholesale prices is suﬃciently small, the prohibit-
ing price discrimination decreases social welfare; otherwise, prohibiting price discrimination
increases social welfare.
Moreover, we derive that (qH + qL)|wH=w∗
H,wL=w∗
L = (qH + qL)|wH=wL=wu∗. Therefore, Proposi-
tion 1 is not identical to the traditionally well-known conclusion regarding third-degree price
discrimination by a monopolistic seller—an increase in total output is a necessary condition for
welfare improvement by third-degree price discrimination.
3.2 The case of permiting price discrimination within a certain extent
Subsection 3.1 showed which is better prohibiting price discrimination wholly or permitting
price discrimination without constraint. However, the real enforcement of prohibiting price
discrimination by a monopolistic wholesaler is not strict. In this subsection, we consider that
the manufacturer can exercise price discrimination within tolerance limits.
We assume that a monopolistic wholesaler face proﬁt-maximizing problem subject to the
following linear constraint:

      
      




















∗(t).8 In this subsection, as well as in subsection 3.1, if we assume that qi > 0 (i = H,L),









∗(t) > 0 (i = H,L) for any t ∈ [0,1] is assumed,

      





















, if δL < δH <
2 + 2θ − θ2
3θ
δL, (12)



















      























8 − θ − θ2δL < δH < δL.
Proof: Appendix B.











∗(t)) is a monotonically decreasing (increasing) function when
w∗
H < w∗
L. Moreover, we can observe that qH (qL) monotonically decreases, qL (qH) monoton-





words, each retail sale of retailers H and L changes as t increases, but the total retail sales re-
main constant. Therefore whether social welfare improves or worsens depends on the shift in























8 − θ − θ2δL < δH < δL. (13)
If δH > δL, although ∂qH/∂t < 0, the sign of [(1−θ)(1−qH)−(cH −cL)] cannot be determined.
Substituting (12) into [(1 − θ)(1 − qH) − (cH − cL)], we obtain
(8 + 5θ − θ2)δH − 2(5 + 2θ − θ2)δL





Therefore, we derive the following:
∂SW
∂t




L, if δL < δH <
14 + 3θ − 2θ2
12 + 4θ − θ2 δL, (14)

           
           
∂SW
∂t





= 0 for t = ¯ t
∂SW
∂t
> 0 for 0 ≤ t < ¯ t
, where ¯ t =




14 + 3θ − 2θ2
12 + 4θ − θ2 δL ≤ δH ≤
2(5 + 2θ − θ2)
8 + 5θ − θ2 δL,
∂SW
∂t





2(5 + 2θ − θ2)
8 + 5θ − θ2 δL < δH <
2 + 2θ − θ2
3θ
δL. (16)
(13) – (16) show that SW monotonically increases as t increases if δH is a little more than
δL, SW ﬁrst increases and then decreases as t increases if δH is moderately more than δL;
5Otherwise, SW monotonically decreases as t increases. This implication and (7) derive the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. We assume that the demand of each retailer is positive whether governments
permit or prohibit price discrimination. If retailer H is charged at higher wholesale price than
retailer L and the diﬀerence between the two wholesale prices is suﬃciently small, permit-
ting price discrimination within a certain extent has a more desirable eﬀect on social welfare
than prohibiting price discrimination. otherwise, prohibiting price discrimination has the most
desirable eﬀect on social welfare.
Proposition 2 supports the soft enforcement of prohibiting price discrimination by a monopo-
listic manufacturer who sells to retailers, but this is exclusive to the situation when the manu-
facturer charges a higher price to retailer H (high-quality, high-cost retailer). Moreover, both
Propositions 1 and 2 imply the possibility of welfare improvement without increasing the total
output. The intuitive interpretation of welfare improvement without increasing the total output
is as follows: When δH > δL and the dierence between δH and δL is small, for most consumers,
choosing retailer L is desirable on social welfare grounds. However, the duopoly in the retail
market leads to a situation wherein the retail sales by retailer L are less than what is desired
on social welfare grounds. When permitted to price-discriminate, a monopolistic manufacturer
increases the wholesale price for retailer H and decreases the wholesale price for retailer L;
accordingly, the retail sales by retailer L increase. Therefore, price discrimination by a monop-
olistic manufacturer cancels out the undersupply of retailer L by duopoly and improves social
welfare.
4. Concluding remarks
The present paper studied third-degree price discrimination in wholesale markets and its
welfare property when a monopolistic manufacturer sells his/her products to two retailers who
have dierent qualities and costs of sales. We observed that price discrimination within a
certain extent increases social welfare under some conditions, which would support the soft en-
forcement of prohibiting price discrimination by a monopolistic wholesaler. Since this increase
in social welfare does not accompany an increase in the total retail sales, the present model
shows one of the extension models in which the well-known conclusion regarding third-degree
price discrimination is not achieved.
Some extensions are worth mentioning. First, we could consider oligopolistic retailers (i.e.,
two retailers) and not duopolistic retailers (i.e., more than two retailers). Even in an oligopolis-
tic retail market, third-degree price discrimination by a monopolistic wholesaler would achieve
the same results as in the present paper. Second, because the demand function considered in the
present paper was linear, the total demand was unaected by price discrimination. However,
when the demand function is nonlinear, the total demand is aected by price discrimination;
therefore, social welfare trends would change. There may be cases wherein welfare improves
with decreasing total output. Finally, we only assumed that a monopolistic manufacturer em-
ploys linear pricing. Thus, we need to consider non-linear pricing, too. Moreover, since the
pricing scheme and price level may be determined by negotiations between the manufacturer
and retailers, we need to consider this negotiations as well. These important and interesting
topics are left for future research.







θ(1 − θ)(4 − θ)
{[θ(2 − θ)(1 − wH − cH) − θ(θ − wL − cL)](wH − cM)+
[−θ(1 − wH − cH) + (2 − θ)(θ − wL − cL)](wL − cM)}.
The ﬁrst-order condition to maximize πM with respect to wu = wH = wL is
∂πM
∂wu =
θ(1 − 2wu − cH + cM) + 2(θ − 2wu − cL + cM)
θ(4 − θ)
= 0,
which gives wu∗ as (8). Moreover, because we assume that qi|wH=wL=wu∗ > 0 (i = H,L), δH =
1−cH−cM and δL = θ−cL−cM must satisfy that [3θ/(2+2θ−θ2)]δH < δL < [(8−θ−θ2)/6]δH,
in which the second-order condition is satisﬁed.
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1




∗(t) > 0 (i = H,L), (2 − θ)(1 − wc
H
∗(t) − cH) >
(θ − wc
L
∗(t) − cL) and θ(1 − wc
H
∗(t) − cH) < (2 − θ)(θ − wc
L
∗(t) − cL) must be satisﬁed.
Since constraint (11) is satisﬁed, we obtain

      


















































































∗(t) − cH + cM) + 2(1 − 2wc
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(17) and (19) give

      
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L, we have Lemma 1 by solving the
dierential equations in (20) and (21).
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